Predicting Trump.

Let me begin by making this one thing clear: if I was an American, I would have voted for Clinton. But I would have had to have held my nose when doing so. I would have had to have looked past her as a person, such as her links to Wall Street Plutocrats and all that, and toward the values her campaign represented. For me, these were and are incomparably superior to those on offer from her rival. So Wednesday morning here in the UK was a disappointment.

That said, just three days on, I am beginning to feel enervated by the shrill apocalyptic predictions about Trump’s presidency. This is not out of a Pollyannish complacency, a psychological defence mechanism against an intractable reality over which I have no influence. I find myself irritated at commentators’ lack of humility. So many predictions about the fate of Trump’s campaign have been so wrong. Yet, cocksure predictions are flying thick and fast, as if the prophets of doom memories extend no further back than last Wednesday.

This is not to say that the doomsayers will be wrong. They may well be right. But is anyone assessing the degree to which their predictions are well founded? Dire predictions are made on the basis of what Trump has said rather than what he has done. Of course, he has never held public office so he has no track record. There are many blanks to fill. But why fill them with the most lurid scares stories? It is true that he ran a divisive campaign, and he himself bears the blame for his opponents reading the worst into his character and motivation.  But this alone gives us no clue as to what he is going to do.

So what is Trump going to do? Answer: despite all the bluster, no one really knows. Are there good reasons for thinking that? Surely there are. First, no one is really able to fathom who the real Donald Trump is. It was said of Clinton that despite decades spent in the public eye, no one really got a sense of who she is. The same might just as well be said for Trump. On any given hot button issue, like abortion or gay marriage, no one can say emphatically what his position is, on the basis of his public utterances alone. And, despite his celebrity status, no one seems able to offer any insight into his motivation or core values. No one seems to know him – not even his own children who, when they talk about him, seem at a loss to offer any insight into their father’s personality.

Since this morning, there is an even better reason for caution when it comes to making predictions as to what he is going to do: his unexpected shift on the issue of Obamacare. On this issue, his public position seemed to be clear. He was going to replace it root and branch. It would be easy, he claimed, while on the campaign stump. Yet now, he is prepared to consider retaining key aspects of it. What is the significance of this?  I am going to venture some suggestions. Not predictions -but limited conjectures, based on a recognition that my answers are based on a background of ignorance, the lack of any conclusive clues about the man’s character and motivation.

We will take the cynical explanations first. Perhaps this is a smokescreen, a kind of chaff to confuse opponents’ radar and conceal his own position and direction of travel. Perhaps this is just spectacle, with no real motivation other than to confound the pundits and keep people guessing. Perhaps it was an off-the-cuff, unscripted remark and he just was not thinking things through. He said it on a whim. If any of these explanations are true, then we can expect him to pivot back back to the Republican mainstream. It’s nothing more than a blip. It’s insignificant.

But what if he is serious? This should not be dismissed out of hand. For one thing, it is inconceivable that any other Republican president-elect would have stated, three days after winning the election, that he would have been prepared to reconsider his root and branch opposition to Obamacare. This is totemic issue for Republicans – on the same level as rolling back abortion rights and opposing gun control. They hate Obamacare and have used all means – fair and foul – to undermine it. Congressional Republicans have voted 50 times to undo the law.

During Trump’s bid for the candidacy, the Republican mainstream liked to present themselves as men of reason and moderation, and made a show of deploring Trump’s brash, vulgar populism. But on Obamacare, the respectable Republican mainstream is out of step with public opinion. Key aspects of Obamacare test well, in surveys of public opinion, as shown in this table taken from Nate Silver’s 538

Extension of dependent coverage to age 26 80%
Close Medicare “doughnut hole” 79
Subsidies for low- and middle-income people to buy insurance 77
Eliminate out-of-pocket costs for preventive services 77
Medicaid expansion 74
Insurers can’t discriminate based on pre-existing health conditions 70
Medical loss ratio 62
Increase Medicare payroll tax on people who make more money 56
Requiring most people to have insurance or be fined 35

Perhaps this table gives a clue to Trump’s motivation. Perhaps his political instincts may be sounder than many of the pundits make out. If the public does not share the Republicans’ Maoist fevour to eradicate 8 years of Obama’s Presidency, starting with a demolition of Obama care, then his shift makes sense. He can count on public support and use that to overcome opposition from his own party. His timing is certainly right. Change course now, while he still enjoys the authority and prestige his victory has conferred. Do it while the voices of naysayers in the Republican establishment – who never believed he could pull it off – are stilled in the wake of his victory.

On one view, if power is all that matters to him, then he will simply fall into line with his party because to do that is the route of least resistance. He has plenty of opponents as it is. He won’t want to cultivate more within his own camp. On the other hand, if power is what matters to him, then a pragmatic course might be the best option to pursue, if it is in line with what the majority of the public thinks. We should not assume that because a man wants power, then this must mean that the only option to retain it is to cleave to hard-right position. He can earn credit and kudos by showing he is own man and a not a tool of the Republican party machine. Perhaps his shift is cynical but that does not mean that cynical motivations have unhappy consequences.

So is the shift a feint or it may it represent a genuine change of heart?  On the basis of what we know about Trump – or rather what we don’t know – both possibilities are just as likely. As far as making predictions is concerned, all that can safely be said is that we should expect the unexpected. Prepare to be surprised.

Update, 14 March 2017. “Prepare to be surprised”, I said. Yes, Trump actually means what he says. As far as his conciliatory tone on healthcare is concerned, this article lends support to my revised view that Trump’s supposedly big heart on keeping the most popular aspects of Obamacare was down to awareness of procedure:

“True, the public supports the provisions of the health law that allow adult children to stay on their parents’ health plans until they turn 26 and that prohibit insurers from rejecting or charging more to people with preexisting health conditions. Those things remain in the GOP bill.

But even if Republicans had wanted to get rid of those provisions, they likely could not. That’s because the budget rules Congress is using to avert a filibuster in the Senate forbid them from repealing much of the ACA that does not affect government spending.”

This dimension Nate Silver left out. Now that I have become aware of it, my view has turned decidedly more pessimistic.

On other matters, cited by the optimists as signs that Trump mellowed when elected, such as his decision to drop the threat of appointing a special prosecutor to investigate Clinton, the reason is probably down to procedural and process. Separation of powers means he does not have the right to appoint a special prosecutor, to confirm a verdict he has already determined before the investigation, to lock Clinton up. As the examples of the travel ban and the border wall show, where procedure is not such an obstacle, Trump means to do as he said.



Ed Miliband’s Mission Impossible

Cover for  Five Year Mission

Review of Tim Bale’s ‘Five Year Mission’, OUP, Oxford, 2015

In the end, it was mission impossible. Ed Miliband could not take Labour from opposition to Government in five years. This book, completed just before the 2015 election, does much to explain why.

We know that people experienced the biggest fall in living standards since the Second World War. We know that wages have stagnated even as the economy recovered. The Tories forced poorer and younger voters to clean up the mess they did not create while featherbedding the nests of richer, older voters. The pain of austerity was not shared equally and made a mockery of Cameron’s claim that we were all in it together.

It made no difference. Labour was hobbled by public perceptions of economic incompetence. They borrowed too much to spend too much and, in saving the banks, they left the country broke. Liam Byrne’s notorious note about the money having run out did Labour no favours. No wonder Cameron brandished it about during the 2015 campaign; such things make more impact than authors like Joseph Stiglitz, who most voters have not heard of, let alone read. The Tories’ plan to fix the mess seemed to make sense. Austerity was harsh and unfair but the country accepted the Tories’ logic, which had a force and clarity that Labour could not answer.

Thus, Labour objected to the Tories’ move to stop benefit rates rising in line with inflation. This was unfair but since the wages of those in employment were stagnating, supporting any rise in benefits could be seen as ‘rewarding’ the idle while those in work struggled to make ends meet. Perverse and unfair this logic is. But Osborne knew what he was doing when he spoke of the shift worker leaving early for work on a dark morning while their neighbour, living on benefits, was sleeping. The Tories knew that images count more than words – let alone statistical analysis.

Then there was immigration. This is a taboo subject for Labour’s supporters on the liberal-left but not for voters generally. This issue, after the economy, was the second millstone around Labour’s neck; its salience with many of its traditional voters made the matter all the more vexing. Labour could not assure that it wouldn’t open the floodgates once again, if it was to take power.

Against all this, Miliband tried to square various circles: to keep the Party united, and define a new post-Blair party that could inspire its grassroots while reassuring middle England and business; to try and produce policy that could be both fair and allow the country to live within its means; to try and meet voters’ concerns over immigration without resorting to crowd-pleasing xenophobic demagoguery. This led to dithering and dilating, as Miliband and Labour struggled to reconcile irreconcilables. By contrast, the Tories could talk tough on welfare while UKIP could do the same on immigration and sound less mealy-mouthed in the process – and ‘authentic’, in the sense of genuinely reflecting broad public concerns.

Bale’s account is sympathetic of Ed Miliband’s and Labour’s predicaments. As for the great what-if-David-had-been-elected-leader counterfactual, then Bale is dismissive. He doubts that the older brother would have had the answers to the questions above. Indeed, given his reportedly arrogant and aloof manner, he might have actually done more harm than good. Ed at least kept the Labour party united in the aftermath of the 2010 defeat – no mean feat.

For Labour activists, this book is essential reading. It will tell them much about what sort of electoral realities the party is going to have to overcome, if it wants to take power in 2020. It has some depressing lessons to be learned about trying to promote high ideals against the low realities of voter psychology, fanned (but not created) by an unsympathetic press in cahoots with a cynical Tory party machine.

One thing is for sure, whoever takes the Labour helm later this month is going to have their work cut out for them. I hope that they have read this book.



The Burkini Ban

Cover or uncover?

One of the best bits of news I have heard all week is the decision of a French court to overturn the so-called Burkini Ban, imposed by mayors in 30 or so French coastal towns. It was the sort of thing that made me embarrassed to admit I am a secular atheist in polite company.

No wonder, for the stated reasons for the bans had little to do with secular values. Secularism is about giving reasons and justifications for taking a given course of action and rejecting justification by appeal to holy dogma – or any dogma. The ‘reasons’ offered in this case were feeble. The suits were said to be unhygienic. But surely no more or no less hygienic than the full-body swimsuits surfers wear? The ban was to stop women standing out, to protect them from assault. Then why not force Hasidic Jewish men to cut off their locks, to protect them from anti-Semitic bigots?

The logic of the public order justification is oppressive – the state would have to police and prohibit all forms of religious dress, in the interests of public safety. In any case, it was and would have been selectively policed – against Muslim women. Add to that the perverse consequences of ‘protecting’ the possible victims by harassing and humiliating them, as stills of police forcing a woman to strip off on a beach showed. The bans offered a remedy which which bore no relation to the disease it was supposed to cure. Recent terrorist attacks have been carried out by young men, who did not dress all that differently from other young men.

Such logic – if logic this was – is premised on the same lugubrious assessment of human nature and motivation as the Islamist zealots who insist women cover up because men cannot contain themselves. ‘Secular’ zealots insist women strip off because the rest of the population seethes with hate which can be unleashed at the slightest signal of difference, like a woman in a burkini. Both have their own fear of ‘fitna’, the anarchy that women can unleash, if they don’t choose their wardrobe carefully.

We have been here before, with the headscarf ban in schools. That time, one could see what the background issues were: socialisation of the young, the reproduction of Republic values and assimilation of minorities, all purposes the French education system is supposed to serve. One could see how the row over headscarves in public schools was a lightening rod for these wider issues. But what is the big deal about the how Muslim women dress on the beach? In 1944, the Normandy beaches were literal battlegrounds and the the outcome of those battles decided the future of France. In 2016, the beaches have become a cultural battleground, without the world-historical significance of 1944 and without a clear idea of what the issue was actually about.

‘Islamophobia’ is the obvious explanation for the ban but this is not a sufficient explanation. The phrase has inadequate explanatory power, which cannot usefully distinguish genuinely well-founded criticisms of Islam from irrational phobias, rooted in racist bigotry. In this instance, bigotry featured prominently but also – and just as plausibly – simple despair. Small-time politicians felt they had to do something in the wake of the Nice terrorist attack and bigger-time ones (like Sarkozy) sensed an electoral opportunity. Politicians feel they must be seen to be acting to deal with a problem. Action is more important than words – any action, just so long as they seen taking action, even if they cannot put into words why they think their actions are justified.

Cartoonists have been quick to point out the symmetry between secular and Islamist zealots, whose putative motives overlap, as the image at the top of this page illustrates. Still, it is absurd to claim that there is a literal like-for-like oppression of women’s oppression between (say) Saudi Arabia and France. On that subject, we can say more.  France does not have anything like the morality police in Saudi Arabia. Women in Saudi Arabia cannot rely on clerical allies to seek redress in the courts, in the way that Muslim women could count on secular allies to seek redress in the French Courts, as they have just done. Saudi courts  uphold the rights of a theocratic system; French courts, a secular system. But there is a key difference. French courts allow individuals  to challenge that system. That includes challenging laws popular with the majority. No such checks exist in Saudi Arabia, where legal systems are about upholding collective imperatives to conform and which allow no individual right to opt out from collective demands. In France, as in other western democracies, individual rights do not trump collective demands in all cases but the individual does have a right to be heard and cannot be silenced just because they belong to an unpopular minority or hold beliefs outside the mainstream.

In overturning this ban, the court will doubtless come under attack from the far Right for attacking democracy. The great French political philosopher, Raymond Aron, an intellectual hero of mine, would have had something to say about that. Pondering the question on how democracies can revive ideas that they believe in, he wrote:

“The idea of popular sovereignty is not essential: it can lead as easily to despotism as to liberty. And after all to a large extent it has been popular majorities that have abused their power.

What is essential to the idea of democracy is legality, governance by laws where power is not arbitrary and unlimited. In my view, democratic governments are those that have a minimum of respect for individuals … one where the authority of rulers is subject to the checks of representation [based] on a legitimate authority that is neither magical or irrational …

But that pursuit takes … the intellectual courage to call everything into question and to identify the problems on which depends the very existence of France ….

Instead of raising our voices with the political parties, we might try and define as sincerely as we can the problems facing us and the best ways of solving them”

(The Dawn of Universal History, New York 2002, 175-176)

Amen to that.


Hate Crimes in the Wake of Brexit

How bad is this problem? According to the  Independent website. hate crimes surged by 42 per cent, though the figure it gives, 3076 crimes between 16 and 30 June, compared to 915 reports in the same period of 2015, indicates that this is 200 per cent rise. However, scepticism has been expressed in some quarters.

The problem is hard to assess. For one thing, we only report hate incidents. We do not compile statistics for instances when encounters between indigenous and migrants are characterised by respect, tolerance and kindness. While waiting for a train in Euston station last month, I bought a magazine from a Black African vendor from W H Smith and polished the interaction with the usual social niceties. So did all of the other customers in the shop. These sorts of everyday, quotidian interactions do not get reported. Only deviations from them do.

In part, this is because the media – and its consumers – are hard-wired to pick up bad news.Plane crashes and medical negligence make news. Safe landings and successful operations do not. But, when coming to the question of hate-crime, there seems to be a default assumption that the indigenous population of these Islands seethe with mindless hatred for foreigners. If so, then the mundane, everyday instances of kindness and respect can be discounted. These are instances of the superego repressing the racist id. Hence, the atypical of the bigot is in fact the typical, just more honest and brutal than the rest of us.

The spate of hate-crime in the wake of Brexit was real – even allowing for arguments over how you can tell the difference between genuine hate crime and ordinary forms of crime, and allowing for the possibility that any form of tension of conflict between indigenous and the foreigner is automatically conflated with hate crime.

But we need a sense of perspective. The taboo against overt forms of racism and discrimination is still very strong. The social and legislative changes we have seen over the past 40 years are not in any danger of being overthrown. The rule of law is holding. Inveterate bigots may have taken Brexit as a signal that open season had been declared against foreigners but they were wrong. We are not seeing flaming crosses going up all over the place.

As I discussed in my post about the murder of the Labour MP Jo Cox, murdered by a fascist a week before the EU referendum, no one wanted to speak up in public for the killer, not even the far right. Even the opponents of her liberal, cosmopolitan values lined up to pay tribute to her.  It was telling that Nigel Farrage felt obliged to lay a bouquet of flowers in her honour. One could scarcely conceive the likes of Donald Trump doing the same.

The country has not changed that much from the day of her murder to now. Some in the Leave camp have accused some Remainders of wanting to see Britain plunge into recession, to be punished for voting the wrong way. There is some truth in that. There is also the sense that some in the Remain camp have never held a high opinion about the tolerant trends of the majority of this country’s indigenous population and, in a perverse sense, want the reports of the surge of hate crimes to herald some rightward shift in the country, in order to make the times we live in just a little less dull.

In this sense, there is a symmetry between them and the likes of Melanie Philips, who really wants to believe that most of Britain’s Muslims are covert suicide bombers, because it satisfies a yearning for an apocalyptic confrontation involving stark choices and the dissolving of moral conflict in decisive action, ending moral ambiguity once and for all.

But Brexit was not the apocalypse. Politics carries on as normal. But things of course are not the same as they were. A fringe political movement – the Eurosceptics – got for what they wished for. They got their country back. But we are still in the EU and the current Prime Minister is making no sound as to when she wants to head towards the exit. The ring leaders either jumped ship (Farrage, Johnson) or were thrown overboard (Gove). May’s cautious approach seems to be accepted by public opinion.That suggests that people are less polarised around the issue that the most passionate advocates for either side think.

Whatever her intentions are, I think that we can consider rumours  of her deporting EU citizens as overblown. EU citizens are not just doing the jobs that the indigenous do not want to do – hundreds of thousands of them are professionals, working in both the public and private sectors. Their sudden eviction would deplete key sectors of the economy like finance and crucial public services like the NHS. Perhaps May is habouring some white version of ‘indigenisation’ programmes dreamed up by people like Robert Mugabe. It seems unlikely. It would be resisted by the Tories own key allies in the business class and Any Trump style mass deportation plan would be impossible to implement in an open society with a strong rule of law. Perhaps this is wishful thinking on my part. But I take heart in the fact that towns like Boston, Lincolnshire have not seen gangs of local thugs instigating pogroms against migrant workers. There are reasons for that and perhaps we ought to start asking why, instead of expecting the worst?



The plot against Corbyn

Like Margaret Thatcher in November 1990, Jeremy Corbyn finds himself in a hole, a hole dug by their own parliamentary parties. Then, as now, they find their backbenchers are determined to bury them in it. In ordinary circumstances, losing the confidence of one’s backbenchers should prove fatal for a leader of a political party. It was for Thatcher but not, thus far, for Corbyn. That is because he has one trump card that she never had. He can appeal to the membership. Thatcher could not. If she did, she might well have survived her ordeal, for doubtless the membership would not have tolerated what was a palace house coup. However, destruction at the hands of the electorate would have more than likely have been the Party’s fate.

We all know why Thatcher’s MPs decided to stab up one of their most successful leaders ever. It was because they feared annihilation at the hands of the electorate. She was going to drive the party over a cliff and many of her MPs with it. Her hated poll tax was just one reason. She was out of touch and, to some, was sounding like she was going mad, with her talk of Thatcherism lasting a thousand years. So they took an axe to her. For her devotees, then and now, this was treachery. But, for the coup leaders, it was a necessary step, for the greater good, as they saw it.

So, why are Corbyn’s MPs desperate to get rid of him? The reason should be obvious. They fear a rout at the hands of UKIP, if he stays on as leader. Otherwise, their behaviour makes no sense. If they thought that Corbyn could carry a snap election, called now, then they would be mad to get rid of him. Even if they had reservations about him, the best thing to do would be to stay silent and therefore retain opportunities to influence him, behind the scenes, once Labour is back in power.

I have serious reservations about what the plotters are doing. But I reject, out of hand, the lazy allegations being made against these backbenchers, which fail to explain their motives. MPs are in their job because they have been elected to do it. Therefore, they would be mad to do anything that ended up with them being thrown out of the job, by their electorates. That would be career suicide and MPs are no more prone to that than the rest of us. As I have said, these MPs would be mad to rebel against a leader with a serious chance of winning a general election, and keeping them in their jobs.

Moreover, the plotters are well aware of the risks of what they are doing. They risk accomplishing what they seek to avoid, namely, splitting the Labour Party, and fatally. They are aware of the gauntlet of public and membership opprobrium that they will have to run. They are aware of the threats of deselection and the ruin of their careers and their reputations. Yet, they are prepared to risk all that rather than have Corbyn at the helm. If simple self-interest was the explanation, then none of this would be worth it.

But, they clearly think that the alternative is worse. Like Tory MPs in 1990, they are convinced that having their current leader at the helm will be suicidal. Those loudly condemning the plotters today for seeking to oust Corbyn would probably have welcomed the ousting of Thatcher in 1990, if they are old enough to remember it. Only Thatcher, unlike Corbyn, was the democratically-elected leader of the UK and no doubt would have won any Conservative leadership contest, if Conservative members had had any say, at the time. Like Spock in the Wrath of Khan, the plotters might have said that the logic of the situation clearly dictates that the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few – or the one (only, unlike Spock, self-sacrifice was out of the question). Then, as now, fear was the dominant motive. Corbyn’s supporters will accept that of Thatcher’s plotters but not those against their own leader.

The question we should be asking, now, is this: are the fears of those wanting to get rid of Corbyn reasonable? If so, then they have a case to be heard. However, if their assessment of their leader’s prospect is wrong, and if their fear of UKIP is overblown, then Corbyn should stay and they should stay silent.

This approach at least allows a genuine conversation to be had. Alas, Corbyn’s die-hard supporters deny that any such conversation is necessary, in spite of the clear evidence that backbenchers’ fear of a UKIP induced meltdown are not groundless; therefore there is a need for their fears to be respected and heard. Instead, there is endless barracking on social media, designed to shut the conversation down, and reminders that Corbyn represents the will of the membership, forgetting, as if we had not been reminded a thousand times already, that the membership is not the same as the country.

Labour is not a pressure group, like Amnesty International. It is a government in waiting. An opposition leader that cannot lead his own shadow government can never lead the real thing. That means being able to deal with opposition and criticism. His supporters, swarming like a shoal of piranhas around critics, simply make it harder for him to acquire the necessary political skills he will need if he is ever to become PM. Opposition and criticism are facts of political life and Momentum cannot shout down all his critics, who won’t all come from Labour’s backbenchers.

My own feeling is that the plotters’ fears are reasonable even if not everything they are doing is. I think they are right to be sceptical about their leader’s prospects and I think their fears of rout at the hands of UKIP are well-founded. UKIP has encroached in Labour heartlands, coming second place in some Northern constituencies in the 2015 election, a truly astonishing development. And, in case no one had noticed, we just had a referendum in which immigration was a salient issue, when large numbers of Labour’s traditional voters flocked to UKIP’s colours, in defiance of exhortations from Labour and its allied unions to vote Remain.

The brutal arithmetic of this has been summed up by Robert Ford, Professor Politics at the University of Manchester, writing in the Guardian:

‘Labour’s problems may run deeper [than the Tories]. They are led by a leader who is an open and professed enthusiast for mass migration and who sits in a borough with the fourth-highest Remain vote in the country. It is hard to see how such a leader can credibly hope to represent the voters in the hundred or more Labour seats where the vote for Leave ran at 60% or more. This much has been obvious to many of the MPs representing those seats for a long time. But it is not yet clear whether it is a message that Labour’s membership – who are among the most socially liberal, cosmopolitan groups in all of England – will be willing to accept.’

These realities are denied by many of Corbyn’s die-hard supporters but for no good reason. But it is they, in their obtuse denial of the brutal realities laid bare in the aftermath of the vote, that threaten to unravel the Labour Party, and not the machinations of its MPs.


It has only been 48 hours since the result to vote Leave was announced but it feels like it was years ago. The worst of my dismay and despair has faded. The winners’ euphoria will take longer to fade but fade it will. But, as this drama unfolds, doubtless there will be further spikes of emotion and some on the Leave side are going to experience their share of disappointments as inevitable compromises are made. A referendum should never have been held but, now that it has, we have to learn to live with it. But it’s time to move beyond sour grapes and offer what are hopefully some constructive suggestions.

Democratic politics is not just about deciding an issue by the vote. What happens after the vote is just as important. That means, the losers must respect the verdict but neither should the winners treat victory as licence to ride roughshod over the interests of the losers. That is especially the case when the margin between defeat and victory is as a narrow as it is, in this referendum.

Democratic politics should not seek to do away with divisions but to manage them. That can be done by conversation, argument and debate, which is endless. To regulate this, at intervals of several years, elections are held, to allow opposing sides to contend for power. Disagreement is far less likely to turn violent if those on the losing side know that they will have an opportunity to take power, some time again, in the future. This strikes a rough and ready balance between the need to get things done but also to make sure opposing sides are heard and their interests accommodated. I discussed this at greater length in an earlier post and don’t feel a need to repeat myself here.

As for referendums, they can be dangerous devices because they seek a yes/no answer to questions that admit no yes/no answers but can only be asked and discussed again and again, not with a view to finding the final answer but a provisional answer, one that will do for now, not for all time.

Referendums can be a ploy to end a discussion by the majority using the vote to shut down the minority, once and for all. Doing this shuts down an essential safety value of democratic politics: the faith that minorities have that defeat in a vote is not once-and-for-all, and that they will have an opportunity to have another go. But this means that those backing the winners on any given occasion are prepared to be the losers another time.

Referendums provide an opportunity for demagogues to deny any need to balance the interests of losers and winners, deny the need to manage disagreement. They promise instead that it is possible to take decisions in which no one loses and everyone gains, and all it takes is a simple yes and no, just once, to end disagreement. My previous post argued that the Leave campaign relied, in large part, on just such demagogic promises, promises which are bound to be unfulfilled.

Technically, our own referendum was a mere vote on whether we wanted to be a member of the EU or not. But it was much more than that. It was a vote on two opposing ideas of what it means to be British, and where a British identity stands in relation to a wider European one. These ideas have profound implications for what sort of society we want to be, and who should be included in it. These questions cannot be settled by a question with a yes/no answer but, to my mind, that is what some members of the Leave crowd have sought to do, to drive alternative conceptions of being British out from the field of ideas altogether. If they think thi referendum will do that, then this is a terrible mistake. The Remain camp, though defeated, has not been routed.

Therefore, two things need to happen. First, the Leave camp must not ride roughshod over the interests of the Remain camp. Second, and in return, Remain respects the verdict. Some reassuring noises have been made from people like Chris Grayling on the Leave side, noting the size of the Remain vote, 48 per cent or just over 16 million people, means their interests have to be respected.

I remain cautiously optimistic that elements of the Leave camp will reach out to the Remain side to find some common ground. For this to happen, it means accepting some degree of compromise, and ditching the uncompromising Farage, whose demagogic instincts are implacable.

Whether this is feasible depends on whether Leave can wrest itself free from the populist expectations it has created. Readers of the Sun will have been left with the impression that we ‘took our country back’ on Friday morning. The realisation is bound to dawn upon many of its readers that we have not in fact done any such thing; indeed, might not be able to do any such thing, in the sense this phrase has been understood. The confounding of such expectations that the Leave camp has done so much to stoke up will surely come back to haunt them.

Remain could do its own bit, irrespective of what happens on the Leave side. It should drop any call for a second referendum, for the same reasons as I argue for saying that it should never have been called in the first place. Referendums are not the tools to settle questions such as the ones we are discussing. Leave voters have something to say and it should be silenced with the blunt instrument of a referendum. Remain needs to make some acknowledgement that the motivations of Leave voters were complex and cannot just be narrowed down to a mindless hatred of foreigners. It should drop talk of London ceding from the rest of the UK, because if you don’t want to live alongside people who are not like you, then how can you complain about Leave voters who voted in order not to live among people who are not like them?

Apart from Northern Ireland, where the vote has split along confessional lines, I don’t think the impact of the vote will be violent. The next Tory Prime Minister will have unprecedented challenges on his or her hands, managing not only the consequences for Britain’s relationship with Europe but also for its component nations. What began as an intra-Tory feud about our place in Europe has spread, throughout the United Kingdom, and threatens to unravel the union itself. A movement that was once written off a one of permanent opposition is on the cusp of finding itself in government. The referendum propelled them there but their victory does not end the argument. So long as the argument carries on, their victory is by no means final. Interesting times lie ahead.

Taking Leave of Leave.

The EU referendum moved from the fringe to the mainstream of UK politics in the space of a generation. Twenty years ago, a single-issue party, the imaginatively named Referendum Party, sponsored by a nasty piece of work called Sir James Goldsmith, huffed and puffed but could not bring the political establishment’s house down. The party lasted three years, before disbanding in 1997, after a series of desultory electoral tallies.

Now, in four days time, Britain might vote to leave the European Union. Sir James is not so much turning in his grave but perhaps on the verge of rising from it. This is an extraordinary development. How did this come to pass?

The answer is quite straightforward. First of all, Cameron put the issue to a vote. This was something that he did not have to do. He called it because he did not anticipate the 2015 General Election would leave him with a comfortable majority, securing his leadership against the pretender to his throne, Boris Johnson. Had he done so, he would never have promised it.

But, more importantly, his decision has provided a lightening rod for the conflation of two issues – sovereignty and immigration. The Tory Eurosceptic right hated the EU but the public, thought suspicious and sceptical of of it, did not share the Eurosceptics’ fanaticism. What has changed is the link between immigration and the EU. Plenty of people who do not have an issue with the EU do have an issue with immigration. This, above all else, has moved the issue from the lunatic fringe on the right to the mainstream.

I am going to vote to remain because I do not believe the demagogic promises of people like Farage, Gove and Johnson. I call their promises demagogic for three reasons. First, they are promising that Brexit will only produce winners and no losers. All gain, and no pain. Second, disavowals by Gove and Johnson to the contrary, the Leave campaign is relies much heavily much on scapegoating outsiders for our problems, leading to the false promise that turning our backs on foreigners will solve our problems. Third, and to cap it alll, there is the vain hope that there will be no need for politics come Brexit, like dealing with people you don’t like, having to compromise and trade-off, settle for second-best, manage competing demands and ration scarce resources. Those are demagogic promises. It’s what Utopia might look like or maybe Planet Earth after the Second Coming but it’s not what the UK will look look after 23 June 2016, whichever way it votes. Let’s add a bit more detail.

First, the Leave campaign promises no losers, only winners, if we Leave. The Remain campaign is warning that there will be plenty of losers it we vote to Leave. The Leave campaign denies this.

We have no way of knowing how plausible the various claims made about the impact on our living standards leaving the EU will have. They cannot be tested in a laboratory beforehand or with controlled experiments. We are going to be forced to make a decision against the background of ignorance. We don’t know what costs or what benefits leaving will bring.

One thing is for sure, and that both sides can agree on, is that our political and economic relations with the EU are hardly marginal or peripheral. Voting Leave will surely disrupt these relationships – how could they not? From that, it stands to reason that there will be costs if we leave. In the long term, perhaps we will all be better off out. Who knows? But, in the meantime, there will be losers and some are going to have to pay. It is a lie to deny otherwise.

But deny this truth is indeed what the Leave campaign has done. One example will suffice. I smelled a rat when Leave claimed that they would match EU subsidies to deprived English regions like Cornwall, payouts the EU will surely cease if we vote to Leave. In making such a promise, they conceded, in a back-handed way, that there are benefits to EU membership and that leaving will cost Cornwall and other deprived English regions. They try to assuage this fear by promising they will match the spend. Since the Leave Camp’s leaders have all defended austerity and attacked public spending, then why should such promises be believed?

Still, having made such promises, they will be bound to keep them. After all, there must be no losers. But, can they assure us that they can keep such promises? How do we know if the economy will allow us to replace lost EU subsidies?

In the last analysis, Gove, Johnson and Farage, white, upper-class males of independent means, are staking their political careers but, if they whole thing goes belly up, they will not be the ones who pay for their principles by joining a dole queue. But we might. They are gambling but we are the ones being asked to put the chips on the table. In short, there will no doubt be costs and benefits to leaving but none of us have any idea of whether we will be the ones to enjoy the benefits, or pay the costs.

Now for the second issue, the scapegoating of outsiders. Now, I don’t think those voting to Leave are by definition racist. Nor is criticism of immigration or even of immigrants racist, by definition. And few in the Remain camp argue that we should do away with border controls. Further, immigration is a real concern of voters and democratically elected representatives must at least listen to these concerns, even if they don’t have to put the matter to a referendum – which, for all intents and purposes, this referendum has become, a vote on immigration.

To my mind, I accept the analysis of the majority of economists that immigrants contribute more to the country than they take out. That said, there is no doubt that not everyone experiences it that way and that some have lost out, especially those on low pay. Immigration has produced winners and losers. To deny this to fall into the same dishonesty of the Leave camp – there can only be winners and no losers.

On top of that, there is the fact of cultural difference and conflict. These conflicts are not, contrary to the claims of some pro-immigration campaigners, conjured out of nowhere by the tabloid press.

That said, there is no doubt that such antagonisms that do exist are being harnessed for political ends. There can be no better example of that than Nigel Farage’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster. The fears this poster is meant to play on are real enough. But it is the trademark of an ethnic demagogue to play these up these fears.

This style of political ‘argument’ is akin to the politics of ethnic mobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa, fanning fears of the other, inciting ones own group’s worst instincts rather than the better angels of their nature. In this case, the people Farage seeks to mobilise are white. This has all the poison brew of ethnic politics: a sense of group victimhood combined with entitlement at the expense of other groups, self-righteous intolerance of other groups, refusing to acknowledge any contribution outsiders make, feeding chauvinism and bigotry.

Both Gove and Johnson have played down this dimension of the Leave campaign and talk more about exalted notions such as sovereignty. This idea is not a left wing or a right wing idea. It is an idea about the location of authority. It deserves respect. In spite of both men’s learned references to political theory and in spite of the the higher intellectual powers that Gove in particular brings into the argument, the Leave camp is not being led by Gove’s head but by Farage’s dark heart.

Apart from Gove, I noted that no other prominent leader of the Leave camp denounced Farage and his poster. That is what I would have expected them to do, if they felt that the issue was more than about immigrants and race baiting. They said nothing not because they are Nazis or racist but because if they did, they would have alienated substantial numbers of their own core vote. These voters are the people who want ‘their country back’ and not in the sense of just taking back parliamentary sovereignty but by keeping foreigners out, and getting rid of the ones already here. 

So, in short, I acknowledge that immigration is a serious public concern. It is wrong to dismiss this out of hand, as too many pro-immigration campaigners do. On the other hand, it is wrong to scapegoat people who, even they have come here for a better life rather than some political reason, deserve to be treated as individuals on their own merits, neither idolised nor demonised. Whether someone was born here or they moved here, we do not discriminate on the basis that membership of a group sanctifies that person. That means migrants respecting our laws. But it also means that we give respect where it is due, impartially. Therefore, a hard-working migrant, cleaning toilets and paying taxes, has a better claim to our respect than drunken, loutish members of our indigenous population getting into a drunken brawl on a Friday night.

That brings me to the third and final consideration: the denial of the need for politics. I have touched on this already. If we vote Leave, some will win and others will lose. The Leave campaign denies this but for no good reason. Politics needs to protect the interests of the losers as much as the winners. As I said, perhaps, in the long run, all will be well. Even if that is so, some will suffer losses. To pretend otherwise is a lie.

We have also seen this in relation to the scapegoating of foreigners, especially the insinuation that all conflicts over resources and entitlements in this country are down to foreigners claiming an unfair share. Not only is this wrong in fact, as foreigners also create wealth as much as they take it, it assumes that such conflicts would cease, if only the indigenous were left on these islands.

Aside from that, the nation will be divided into two camps at loggerheads with each other, with opposing understandings of what it means to be British and how we should position ourselves in relation to the rest of the world. We will have to live together, whatever happens, and we will need politics in order to do that.

Leave seems to think that such divisions will fade in the course of time, tranquillised by the new era of abundance that will dawn with our departure.

No such thing will happen. Divisions are endemic to any society and they would persist even if we threw all the foreigners out. Whatever the result, I doubt it will be decisive enough to settle the argument once and for all. The argument will carry on and disagreement will have to be contained because we don’t want to see more incidents like Jo Cox’s murder. There will also be plenty of foreigners still living among us, and contributing to this country. They too will demand a say and their demands will need to be heard, whether in or out of the EU. We will need to use politics to deal with that, too. And that’s before we count Scotland, which may well vote to Leave the UK. Even if they don’t, then a Leave vote will certainly alienate Scots from the Union still further and deepen existing conundrums over the future of the UK as a united entity.

Then there is the rest of Europe. Perhaps we can negotiate various deals with European countries that can keep the best of both worlds. Good luck to those negotiators, I say. Since we will have repudiated a bloc of 27 other countries, we are going to have to go it alone, without allies. We can’t count on the United States, given its pro-EU stance. Even if Trump gets in, his isolationism is not necessarily friendly to our interests. Who does that leave us with? Putin? The Chinese?

But above all else, the Leave camp will split. They will quarrel over the allocation of resources, over the status of the hundreds and thousands of foreigners already in the country, over which interest groups to appease, over which promises to keep and which to break, over the struggle to manage the substantial legislative programme that leaving the EU will involve in Parliament, where pro-Remain MPS will no doubt carry on guerilla warfare.

None of this is to say that the Remain camp has conducted its campaign without resorting to its own share of trickery, dodgy claims and scaremongering. But there is one crucial difference and this has clinched it for me. Remain is not claiming that the EU is perfect. It does not deny that problems will persist. Leave can find nothing good to say about the EU and posits an alternative but they cannot spell out what it would look like, expect that it would be rid of all our problems. No, I just don’t believe that.

Leave’s aspirations are messianic, akin the style of thinking one finds in splinter revolutionary groups who think, come the revolution, all divisions and conflicts will vanish. This is Middle England’s own version of the 20th Century’s failed revolutionary projects. Leave the EU, all will be well. This not only lacks credibility. It lacks common sense. I thought we British were well-endowed with this quality. It would seem not.